

O 131308Z NOV 90  
FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0680  
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE  
USCENTCOM REAR MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOGADISHU 09903

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PINS](#) [EAID](#) [SO](#)  
SUBJ: NOVEMBER 11 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: A) STATE 380832 (NOTAL) B) MOGADISHU 09699

11. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

12. SUMMARY: THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE AS COHEN'S LETTER WELCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND ACCEPTED THE POINT THAT THE REGIME'S COMMITMENT NEEDS TO BE DEMONSTRATED IN CONCRETE FASHION BEFORE IT COULD LEAD TO ADDITIONAL RESOURCE FLOWS. THE MINISTER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GSDR HAS OFFERED TO SEND TROOPS TO JOIN COALITION FORCES BUT HAD NO WORD ON SAUDI REACTION. HE REPORTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S TOUR OF GCC COUNTRIES IS GOING WELL BUT DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFIC RESULTS. HE ASKED FOR HELP PERSUADING THE REBEL MOVEMENTS TO ATTEND THE CAIRO CONFERENCE AND FOR PRESSURE ON THE ETHIOPIANS TO STOP PROVIDING THEM WITH SANCTUARY. FINALLY, HE EMPHASIZED THE URGENT NEED FOR EMERGENCY FOOD SHIPMENTS TO MOGADISHU. END SUMMARY.

13. INTRODUCTION: CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER AHMED MOHAMED ADEN NOVEMBER 11 TO DELIVER AS COHEN'S SECOND MESSAGE (REFTEL A) AS WELL AS THE LETTER I HAD PROMISED THE MINISTER ON THE BROOKE AMENDMENT (REFTEL B). ASSISTANT MINISTER BASI TOOK NOTES FOR ADEN. I WAS UNACCOMPANIED.

14. AMERICAN ASSISTANCE: AFTER READING COHEN'S LETTER, THE MINISTER ASKED IN EFFECT WHAT IT WAS ALL ABOUT. I EXPLAINED THAT COHEN HAD BEEN CONCERNED BY AD/N'S VERY NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO HIS FIRST LETTER. HE WANTED TO UNDERLINE THAT THE USG APPLAUDS THE GSDR'S INTENTION TO LIBERALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LIFE. HOWEVER, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SKEPTICISM IN WASHINGTON ABOUT THE GSDR'S COMMITMENT. BEFORE REFORM COULD LEAD TO RENEWED ASSISTANCE FLOWS, THERE MUST BE EVIDENCE THAT THE REFORMS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED, E.G. POLITICAL PARTIES MUST HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO FORM AND INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS ALLOWED TO PUBLISH. THE BROOKE PROBLEM ALSO MUST BE RESOLVED. AT THAT POINT, I GAVE AD/N A LETTER THE USAID DIRECTOR AND I HAD PREPARED ON BROOKE AND ITS LOCAL CONSEQUENCES.

15. RESPONDING, THE MINISTER SAID HE ACCEPTED THE REASONABLENESS OF WASHINGTON'S SKEPTICISM, "CONSIDERING ALL THE HOSTILE PROPAGANDA THERE". HE VOLUNTEERED THAT ON RE-READING COHEN'S FIRST LETTER HE HAD FOUND IT MORE UNDERSTANDABLE THAN ON FIRST REVIEW. AD/N SAID HE REPEATED TO SIAD WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN RESPONDING TO IRAQI AGGRESSION, I.E. GCC COUNTRIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ADDRESSING THE ECONOMIC LOSSES EXPERIENCED BY STATES LIKE SOMALIA, WHILE THE USG TAKES ON MOST OF THE HUMAN, POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL COSTS OF THE MILITARY RESPONSE. HE HAD NOT, THE MINISTER SAID, SHOWN COHEN'S FIRST LETTER TO SIAD.

16. PRIME MINISTER'S MISSION: ADNR REPORTED THAT HE HAD HEARD BY TELEPHONE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE LATTER'S TOUR OF GCC STATES IS GOING WELL. HOWEVER, HE SAID, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT BEEN MORE SPECIFIC. I THEN ASKED ABOUT THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION'S PUBLIC OFFER TO HAVE SOMALI TROOPS SERVE ALONGSIDE OTHER

COALITION MILITARY UNITS, AND AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE SAUDIS HAD ACCEPTED THIS OFFER. ADEN SAID HE KNEW THE OFFER HAD BEEN MADE BUT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING ABOUT ITS ACCEPTANCE. COMMENTING THAT THE GSDR COULD ONLY SEND A FEW HUNDRED SOLDIERS, HE ASKED WHAT DIFFERENCE SUCH A SMALL NUMBER COULD MAKE. I RESPONDED THAT THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF ANOTHER ARAB LEAGUE STATE IN THE COALITION'S MILITARY FORCES WOULD UNDERLINE THAT SADDAM'S AGGRESSION IS ANATHEMA, EVEN TO THOSE OTHERWISE CLOSEST TO HIM. AFTER ASKING A FEW NEUTRAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL US MILITARY FORCES, THE MINISTER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE CONFLICT CAN BE RESOLVED WITHOUT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

17. RECONCILIATION: STATING THAT PEACE IS NECESSARY FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THE GSDR NEEDS THE HELP OF THE ITALIAN, BRITISH AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. HE ASKED THAT ALL THREE MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE SOMALI REBEL MOVEMENTS TO ATTEND THE CAIRO CONFERENCE AND OTHERWISE ENGAGE IN RECONCILIATION WITH SIAD'S REGIME. HE ALSO ASKED THAT PRESSURE BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ETHIOPIANS TO STOP PROVIDING TO THE REBEL MOVEMENTS THE SANCTUARY WHICH ALLOWS THEM TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE.

18. FOOD AID: THE MINISTER DESCRIBED HUNGER IN MOGADISHU AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO PEACE. NOTING THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY HIS MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES OF MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM ON THE SUBJECT, HE PLEADED FOR FASTER AMERICAN ACTION. THE FRENCH, HE SAID, HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE 3,000 TONS OF WHEAT, AND THE ITALIANS ARE TO FURNISH 4,000 TONS OF RICE. I EXPLAINED THAT PREPARATION OF OUR PROPOSAL HAS BEEN DELAYED BY THE TIME IT HAS TAKEN TH/RED CRESCENT TO ENGAGE IN SURVEY AND ORGANIZATIONAL WORK WITH WHICH IT HAS HAD LITTLE PRIOR EXPERIENCE. AD/N TOOK THE POINT BUT STRESSED THE URGENT NATURE OF THE FOOD CRISIS IN THE CAPITAL AND ITS DESTABILIZING POTENTIAL.

19. APO: AS THE MEETING ENDED SO THAT THE MINISTER COULD MEET WITH SIAD ON THE BROOKE ISSUE, I GAVE HIM THE TEXT OF A LETTER REQUIRED AS PART OF OMC'S PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF AN APO IN MOGADISHU. I POINTED OUT THAT AN APO IS AUTHORIZED BY THE MILITARY ACCESS AGREEMENT. ADEN MADE NO COMMITMENT BUT SEEMED WELL DISPOSED.

BISHOP